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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Internet of Things and Long Term Evolution Network
The Internet of Things (IoT), a network connecting different objects including physical
objects (things) has recently evolved by integrating the concept of Internet with various
wired and wireless technologies, to ultimately control and manage different things in
our environment [Jover 2015]. Examples of the Internet of Things include cloud-based
systems, health-care monitoring, smart transportation, entertainment related applica-
tions, smart cities, machine-to-machine communications, and smart electricity grids.
The Internet of Everything (IoE) that supports all the data generated and transmitted
by these IoT objects, will ultimately revolutionize our society.
The IoT concept uses a unique identifier for each object in order to make the object
available to other objects and to the applications related to the use and functionality
of the objects. These objects are devices and users that have the ability to transmit
information over the network for Device-to-Device communication (D2D), person-to-
person communication, and person-to-device interaction. D2D communication enables
direct communication between the devices. It is an exciting and innovative feature of
the next generation cellular networks allowing traffic through any network infrastruc-
ture, which provides interconnections between the critical public safety network, the
ubiquitous commercial network, and the users [Lin et al. 2014]. Very recently, D2D
communication has been added to the Long Term Evolution (LTE) in 3GPP Release-12
Author’s addresses: N. Saxena and S. Grijalva, School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia
Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA, 30332.
N. S. Chaudhari, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Visvesvaraya National Institute of
Technology, Nagpur, and also with Indian Institute of Technology, Indore, Simrol, 453552, India.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned
by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or repub-
lish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request
permissions from permissions@acm.org.
c© 2016 ACM. 1533-5399/2016/03-ARTxx $15.00
DOI: 0000001.0000001
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. x, No. x, Article xx, Publication date: March 2016.
xx:2 N. Saxena et al.
as proximity services [Alam et al. 2014]. Today, we have 15 billion IoT devices, and a
Cisco report predicts 50 billion devices by 2020 [Barbara V. Lundin 2015].
The LTE, a radio access technology, was evolved with several objectives that enable
a 4G (4th Generation) heterogeneous network with high resource capacity, low cost at
customer end, low latency, good quality of service, and good coverage across the wide
area [Seddigh et al. 2010]. As a result, LTE is today one of the fastest growing wireless
technologies. According to a report by Global Mobile Suppliers Association (GSA), LTE
is being used in large communication systems worldwide with subscriber rates of over
130% annually [GMSA 2015]. Nevertheless, applying IoT in today’s large distributed
systems, such as smart grid, transportation, and telecommunication systems, faces
many research challenges including handling a high volume of traffic, and providing
different services to a large group of devices in a secure manner.
1.2. Security and Privacy of the IoT
Security and privacy are the main challenges in managing IoT-based services, partic-
ularly in systems including a very large number of devices. Because many large-scale
systems are connected to the LTE network for high speed data communication, their
data security and privacy preservation are crucial. In addition, critical infrastructure
systems are the targets of sophisticated cyber-attacks over the communication net-
work. Therefore, it is important to extend LTE authentication processes and make
sure that the security mechanisms are scalable to a large number of IoT devices. Pri-
vacy and security attacks are the major concerns for the IoT-enabled LTE network. If
the IoT object/entity’s identity (ID) is revealed to an attacker, it can perform Man-in-
the-Middle (MITM) as well as impersonation attacks. In fact, there are devices avail-
able in the market, such as International Mobile Subscriber identity (IMSI) catcher
that can perform such attacks. The probability of facing identity or key theft over
the IoT-enabled LTE network is also high, as some parts of the LTE network are
still deployed with the support of 2G and 3G networks. Mobility may or may not be
supported depending upon the applications of the IoT-enabled LTE network. For ex-
ample, most smart grid applications, such as smart-metering and smart building, do
not have a need for handover. On the other hand, an efficient and secure handover is
required for the IoT-enabled smart transportation. In realistic scenarios, the entity’s
identity (sender as well as receiver) protection is necessary for service-driven applica-
tions that handle critical information and critical systems. Some of these applications
are military services, health-care monitoring, content-based cloud services, location-
based mobile services, smart cities-based services, home automation services, environ-
ment monitoring services, and smart grid sensing and control applications. Different
types of connected devices interact remotely over the Internet with default or no ac-
cess credentials, and the communication traffic takes place across different networks.
In such scenarios, it is extremely important to protect the data, as the provider has
practically no control once the data moves over the other networks.
Although the IoT service-operators are providing services based on their existing
infrastructure, the existing authentication and encryption processes are still not suf-
ficient in order to resist threats and attacks over the network. For example, Global
System for Mobile Communication (GSM) networks are considered insecure over-the-
air [Firoozjaei and Vahidi 2012]. Similarly, Universal Mobile Telecommunication Sys-
tem (UMTS) as well as LTE networks suffer from various security limitations [Zhang
and Fang 2005]. Some of the 2G shortcomings were addressed by 3G, and the issues
of 3G are being addressed in the 4G network. Various GSM Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) variants [Firoozjaei and Vahidi 2012], [Fanian et al. 2010], [Lee et al.
2003], [Chang et al. 2003] and UMTS-AKA variants [Zhang and Fang 2005], [Tang and
Wu 2008], [Lin et al. 2005], [Al-Saraireh and Yousef 2006] were presented in 2G and
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3G networks, respectively. Recently, the LTE research community has started to re-
search the IoT objects’ communications aspects. There are known security issues with
the existing LTE-AKA protocol. Some of the vulnerabilities of 4G security have been
identified and addressed in [Aiash et al. 2010], [Park and Park 2007].
From the implementation point of view, we propose that the cellular system has a
cyber-security layer on top of the communication network. This cyber-security layer
includes critical modules, such as authentication, authorization, and encryption. How-
ever, embedded devices, such as mobile phones and smart meters, have limited comput-
ing resources. Therefore, it is strongly recommended to revisit authentication schemes
in order to enable support for the IoT devices, while keeping the traffic privacy and
information security preserved. The scheme must provide mutual authentication to
mitigate security attacks for gaining control over the IoT network-based devices.
In the future generation network, the identity identifiers requirement for the users
and the devices will be a great challenge. Some of the numbering and identification
plans have been extended in order to support a large number of IoT devices. For in-
stance, in E.164, E.212 and 3GPP TS 23.003 [GSM Association 2014], the ITU-T de-
fines the identifiers’ structure in which communication module supports 15 digit direc-
tory numbers for subscribers and 3 digit mobile network codes. We believe that more
digits are required than this proposal in order to provide various services over the In-
ternet/cellular network. In extremely large and complex systems, such as smart elec-
tricity grids, cellular systems, and cloud-based systems, these identifiers are needed
in very large quantities in order to support massive IoT devices and users. Therefore,
the future generated frameworks and protocols must support a standard that can deal
with billion of the devices as well as the users with different communication networks.
Some of the causes of fake identifies of the IoT devices in the network include:
— Sometimes, operators use substituted identities for IoT devices that have been ded-
icated to other devices in the network. This misleads other operators as well as the
devices receiving information from the IoT devices.
— The identifier is not well protected within the device due to poor coding techniques.
— If the operators cannot distinguish legitimate identity from the malicious one, it
may later assign a legitimate identity to the adversary’s device.
Limited or non-existing regulations are available to verify the identity of the devices.
As a result, adversaries can easily spread fake or malicious identities in the network
and divert the communication for malicious purposes.
1.3. Research Problem
Previously, 2G AKA and 3G AKA protocols have been developed to support communi-
cation among various users and devices. However, these protocols do not fit well in the
4G system due to two weaknesses:
(a) 4G networks are heterogeneous networks, which are connected using wireless tech-
nologies and some unprotected wired parties of 2G/3G networks via IP-based bone
networks [Chlamtac et al. 2003]. This may lead to existing Internet attacks [Check
Point Soft. Tech. 2013].
(b) Both, 2G and 3G AKA protocols do not provide mutual authentication between the
wired parties, and many times they provide weak encryption between the base sta-
tion and the mobile user.
The 4G network has resolved the limitations of 2G/3G cellular networks and proposed
an Evolved Packet System-based Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) pro-
tocol for the LTE network. However, this protocol has the following serious security
drawbacks, which are crucial challenges for the IoT-enabled services over the network:
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. x, No. x, Article xx, Publication date: March 2016.
xx:4 N. Saxena et al.
(a) In the LTE network, the identity of each object (device), e.g., IMSI, is sent from the
User Entity (UE) to the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in clear text over-the-
air interface that causes MITM and object-ID attacks [Tang et al. 2003], [Alquhayz
et al. 2012].
(b) Passing clear text Key Set Identifier (KSI) of Access Security Management Entity
(ASME), i.e., KSIASME , (generated by each object) from the MME to the UE over
the LTE network is another limitation. The IMSI and KSIASME protections are
very crucial during communication over the network, as adversary A can misuse
this information, which leads to object-ID theft and to key-ID theft.
(c) In the EPS-AKA protocol, both, the UE and the Home Subscriber Server (HSS)
maintain a counter that causes a synchronization conflict.
(d) Communication and computation overheads generated by the existing LTE proto-
cols are very large, and do not support IoT functionality over the network.
(e) The existing protocols are not secure enough against various security attacks.
In the future, it is expected that latest LTE technologies will provide a secure and
efficient services to the IoT objects. Also, there may be situations in which the IoT de-
vices behave in an abnormal way and increase network load, such as generating and
sending fake traffic. These situations occur when a victim object cannot verify legiti-
mate objects connected to it in the network. Adversary A can connect with the victim
object and compromise its security, for instance by retrieving the user and key set
identifier of the object, and disturbing the network traffic to change counters used for
the objects’ synchronization. Also, the proposed solution should be efficient in terms
of overheads and execution time as compared to existing LTE protocols, and must be
secured against attacks. Therefore, it is extremely important to provide mutual au-
thentications in the IoT-enabled network.
1.4. Contribution
In this paper, we focus on the existing security and privacy problems present in the
LTE network, and propose a novel secure and efficient protocol that is entirely based on
the symmetric key cryptosystem. We propose symmetric key algorithms because they
are about 1000 times faster than asymmetric key algorithms. The main contributions
of the present work are as follows:
(1) The proposed protocol completely hides the actual identity of the object, i.e., IMSI,
during authentication over the network. It also restricts the key set identifier
KSIASME to be transmitted over the network.
(2) Our protocol defeats object-ID theft, man-in-the-middle, impersonation, and key-ID
theft attacks over the LTE network. Our protocol provides untraceability, forward
privacy, and anonymity to various users and devices in the network.
(3) The protocol reduces 6.1%, 11.8%, 11.7%, and 13.4% of the bandwidth consump-
tion during authentication between the MME and the HSS considering single au-
thentication vector as compared to existing LTE protocols EPS-AKA, Kφien’s AKA,
Purkhiabani’s AKA, and Choudhury’s AKA, respectively.
(4) The synchronization problem that occurs in EPS-AKA is resolved. Our protocol does
not maintain any sequence number or counter, rather uses timestamps and MACs
to accept/reject each message.
(5) The communication overhead is also reduced by 6%, 18.5%, and 12.9% in compar-
ison to the Kφien’s AKA, Purkhiabani’s AKA, and Choudhury’s AKA protocols, re-
spectively. In other words, our protocol is able to solve the above mentioned security
problems without increasing the bandwidth requirement and overhead.
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Table I: Symbols and Abbreviations
Symbol Definition Size (bits)
eNB Evolved node B –
USIM Universal subscriber identity module –
IMSI/ID International mobile subscriber identity 128
TID/GUTI Temporary identity/global unique TID 128
DMSI Dynamic mobile subscriber identity 166
CID MME/ASME EPS context identity 48
SQN Sequence number 48
TAI Tracking area identity 64
SNID Serving network identity 128
AV-req Authentication vector request 8
NetType Network type 3
PI Protocol identifier 4
AMF Authentication management field 48
RAND/MSR Random number 128
AK/XAK Anonymity key 128
CK/XCK Cipher key 128
IK/XIK Integrity key 128
SK/K Secret key shared b/w UE and HSS 128
KSIASME /XKSIASME Key set identifier for each KASME 3
ACK Acknowledgement 3
KASME MME intermediate key 256
KNASint Integrity key for NAS signaling 256
KNASenc Cipher key for NAS signaling 256
KeNB Intermediate key b/w MME and UE 256
KUPenc Cipher key for user plane 256
KRRCenc Cipher key for RRC signaling 256
KRRCint Integrity key for RRC signaling 256
MAC/XMAC Message authentication code 64
RES/XRES Response/expected response 64
T/Actcode Timestamp/activation code for USIM 64
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related re-
search on security of LTE networks and its authentication protocols. Section 3 dis-
cusses authentication process in the LTE network in detail, while section 4 presents
the security and privacy attack model. The novel AKA protocol for IoT-enabled LTE
network is proposed and presented in section 5. Section 6 analyses the security of
the protocol. Section 7 addresses protocol performance. Finally, the conclusions of the
present work are summarized in Section 8. Table I represents various symbols and
abbreviations used in the paper along with symbol sizes in bits. Table II describes the
role of cryptographic functions used in the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Various research works have been performed to make the LTE network more reliable,
cost effective, and easy to connect and to access. Prevention against various threats
and attacks as well as privacy preservation are the major concerns of the LTE network
[Peng et al. 2012a]. It has been determined that in order to achieve privacy preserva-
tion and attacks resistance, the protocols and security algorithms used in 4G must be
significantly improved [Matos et al. 2007]. In the last five years, both symmetric key-
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Table II: Cryptographic Functions Definition
Function Definition
f1() Function to generate TID
f2() Function to generate MAC/XMAC
f3() Function to generate RES/XRES
f4() Key generation function for CK
f5() Key generation function for IK
f6() Key generation function for AK
f7() Key generation function for KASME
f ′() Function to generate KSIASME
EK{}/DK{} Functions to cipher/decipher message
based [Hadiji et al. 2009], [Kφien 2011], [Gu and Gregory 2011] as well as asymmetric
key-based [He et al. 2008], [Zheng et al. 2005] AKA protocols for the LTE network have
been proposed by various researchers. The current focus is on IoT involving cellular
network-based applications, such as smart grid, cloud computing, health monitoring,
mobile banking, and mobile commerce supported [Peng et al. 2012b]. In the literature,
different authentication protocols [Hadiji et al. 2009], [Kφien 2011], [Gu and Gregory
2011], [He et al. 2008], [Zheng et al. 2005], [Choudhury et al. 2012] for the LTE network
have been proposed. Vintila [Vintila et al. 2011] presents an outline of LTE security.
Gu [Gu and Gregory 2011] and Choudhary [Choudhury et al. 2012] prevent IMSI to be
sent over the network. Kφien [Kφien 2011] and Purkhiabani [Purkhiabani 2012] pro-
vide resistance against redirection attack, but do not defeat MITM, Object-ID theft,
and key-ID theft attacks. Gu [Gu and Gregory 2011] does not propose any solution to
these three attacks, while Choudhory [Choudhury et al. 2012] only addresses object-ID
theft. Only Gu [Gu and Gregory 2011] has proposed solutions to the synchronization
problem that appears between the UE and the MME/HSS. Out of these protocols, only
[Choudhury et al. 2012] provides object identity protection over the network. How-
ever, this protocol generates a large communication overhead, and does not discuss
prevention against attacks, such as MITM, replay, redirection, and impersonation. Ad-
ditionally, the protocol suffers a synchronization problem related to the transmission
of authentication related information. In summary, none of the above mentioned pro-
tocols is able to protect KSIASME as well as object’s identity IMSI over the network.
3. AUTHENTICATION IN THE LTE NETWORK
In this section, we briefly outline the authentication process and the EPS-AKA proto-
col. The authentication in the LTE network generates different keys for Radio Resource
Control (RRC) signaling, Non-Access Stratum (NAS) signaling, and User Plane (UP).
Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) show the key generation process as well the authentica-
tion, integrity, and ciphering processes for RRC signaling, NAS signaling, and UP. The
SK key, stored on the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and the HSS, gen-
erates cipher key CK, integrity key IK, and a session key KASME , which then derives
other cipher and integrity keys for all signaling planes as shown in Figure 1(a).
Figure 2 illustrates the EPS-AKA protocol, which starts by sending a service request
with an attach request NAS message from the UE to the MME. The MME verifies the
identity of the UE and asks to send its IMSI or Global Unique Temporary Identity
(GUTI) using Tracking Area Update (TAU) procedure depending upon whether the
UE is requesting first time or it is an existing user. The MME sends GUTI with TAU
message to the old MME over the S10 interface to extract the actual IMSI of the UE. If
the UE was present earlier in a roaming 2G/3G network, a new MME connects to the
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(a) Key generation procedure. (b) Authentication, ciphering, and integrity flow.
Fig. 1: Authentication and key generation process in the LTE network.
Fig. 2: EPS-AKA protocol of the LTE network.
{MAC = f2(SQN,RAND,AMF )SK , XRES = f3(RAND)SK , CK = f4(RAND)SK , IK = f5(RAND)SK ,
AK = f6(RAND)SK , KASME = f7(SQN ⊕ AK,SNID,CK, IK), AUTN = (SQN ⊕ AK,AMF,MAC),
AV = (RAND,XRES,KASME , AUTN)}
old MME through Serving GPRS Gateway (SGSN) via S3 interface to extract IMSI
of the UE. Thereafter, the MME connects to the HSS via S6a interface and verifies
IMSI of the UE through a diameter permission message. The HSS generates a new
Authentication Vector (AV) set (or a single vector) and sends it to the MME. This AV
consists of a random number RAND, Authentication Token (AUTN), signed response
XRES, and access security management entity key KASME . Both, the HSS and the UE
maintain a counter for synchronization purpose. A major improvement in EPS-AKA
compared to UMTS-AKA is that the cipher key CK and the integrity key IK are never
actually sent by the HSS. The UE sends signals to the MME with the type of access
network it uses (for Evolved - Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN),
set AMF = 1). Thereafter, the MME sends RAND and AUTN to the UE, and waits for
the response. The MME also sends a key set identifier eKSI to the UE through Evolved
NodeB (eNB). There are two types of eKSI: one is KSIASME and other is KSISGSN . The
KSIASME is used to indicate a native EPS security context, while the KSISGSN is used
to indicate a mapping security context. On receiving, the UE computes RES and sends
it to the MME. Then, the MME compares RES with the computed XRES. The UE gets
authenticated only if both are same. The confidentiality and integrity protections in
NAS signaling between the UE and the MME are provided by KNASenc and KNASint
keys, respectively. The traffic confidentiality and integrity protections between the UE
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and the eNB are covered by KRRCenc and KRRCint keys, respectively, while UP data
between the UE and the eNB (serving gateway-SGW) is protected by KUPenc key. The
NAS and RRC signaling integrity protections are provided by AES or SNOW.
4. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we discuss the security and privacy attack model for the IoT-enabled
LTE network. We consider a communication scenario with legitimate users/devices as
well as an adversary A. If adversary A is able to retrieve the identity of a user/device
by eavesdropping the network or by using a tracking device, A can perform the attack
and harm the system on behalf of legitimate victim user/device. A’s strength is defined
by a set of oracles that it can access and be allowed to make queries. A weak adversary
never corrupts the message whereas a destructive adversary may corrupt the message
at any time. We consider a strong adversary that may corrupt the message at any time
without destroying the message. Furthermore, the security issues of clear text trans-
mission of IMSI and KSIASME may result in various possible attacks. This security
model is based on indistinguishability, where in the challenge phase the adversary is
provided with two different messages. Later in the guess phase, A has to guess the
correct message. A knows both messages in clear text, A is unable to identify which of
the two messages was encrypted to produce a given ciphertext.
Definition 4.1. (IND-CMA: Indistinguishability under Chosen Message Attack): A
protocol is IND-CMA secure if no adversary A can distinguish which of two messages
msg1 and msg2 in time t was encrypted, and has no or negligible advantage.
Pr
k←KG(1λ)
[A(msg1) = 1]− Pr
k←KG(1λ)
[A(msg2) = 1] ≤ .
A man-in-the-middle attack can occur when a UE tries to connect to the eNB/MME,
or in the case where the UE requires the transmission of IMSI during the initial re-
quest. In this attack, A puts itself in between the target object (user/device) and a
genuine network, and captures, modifies, eavesdrops, spoofs signaling, and does data
exchanges between both parties. This is only possible if the network is unencrypted.
Unfortunately, most of the networks are either unencrypted or provide security with
weak and vulnerable algorithms, such as A5/1 and A5/2. A can intentionally re-send
a previously used message as a fresh message to the MME or the UE, which results
in a replay attack. Also, A may increase its signal strength to redirect and connect
the legitimate user with a fake MME to perform redirection attack. Nowadays, due
to the availability of phone number catcher in the market, it becomes easy to catch
the GSM/UMTS phone number/IMSI over-the-air. The object-identity transmitted in
clear text during the initial request procedure of EPS-AKA compromises the entire
system. Creating security gap exploitation allowing an eavesdropper to track an ob-
ject’s location that results in an object-ID theft. A can send signaling and/or object
data to the receiver in order to make the receiver believe that it is originating from a
genuine source that leads to an impersonation attack. A can also capture subsequent
session or derived keys based on the information from parent key and its KSI, which
compromises key secrecy and causes key-ID theft.
On the other hand, revealing the user/device’s identity toA results in privacy issues.
For instance, A can easily track the behavior of the victim user/device, and perform
unwanted activities, such as linking messages in order to extract information of the
victim, sending fake traffic to the victim, and retrieving personal and location related
information. In a computational environment, privacy properties are typically defined
by means of games. We consider untraceability, forward privacy, and anonymity prop-
erties to be maintained by the IoT-enabled LTE network. In the challenge phase, we
assume that A can eavesdrop communications and can also query all the messages
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in the system. Then A chooses a message msg1 randomly from the set and makes
a query. The game is over once A announces its guess of the selected message. Un-
traceability means that an adversary or others cannot trace actions performed by an
object. The protocol satisfies untraceability if A cannot detect that the generated ci-
phertext message belongs to which one of the two known messages with probability
higher than random guessing and also cannot learn at protocol level about the object
to which the message belongs to. A cannot distinguish whether the two generated ci-
phertexts correspond to the same or two different messages, say msg1 and msg2, and
belong to one or two different objects. We also consider forward and backward un-
traceability. Forward untraceability refers to A not being able to determine if at time
tfrw (tfrw > t) a message belongs to a particular user/device. Similarly, backward un-
traceability means thatA cannot determine if at time tbrd (tbrd < t) a message belonged
to a particular user/device. We also model the forward privacy property of our system.
It is similar to untraceability with the additional capability that A is able to break one
of two messages and retrieves the information in the message. Clearly, A can trace
the user/device. However, forward privacy is maintained if A is still unable to trace
previous protocol sessions. Moreover, we also consider the anonymity property for our
system, which refers to the fact that only the sender and the intended receiver can
know the identity of actual object (user/device). There is a slight difference between
user/device’s anonymity and untraceability. Object anonymity means that except for
the object and the home network, nobody including the serving network can retrieve
the identity of the object, whereas untraceability means that except for the object and
the home network, nobody including the serving network is able to identify previous
protocol runs that involved the object.
5. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section presents a new authentication protocol for the IoT-enabled LTE network,
which addresses the authentication shortcomings of the existing LTE network and
supports IoT devices. The proposed protocol provides prevention against various secu-
rity and privacy attacks for diverse types of IoT services. The purpose of the eNB node
and other elements in our protocol are the same as in the LTE architecture. In this
paper, we consider an identity of the object (mobile user equipment) as IMSI. This sce-
nario can be further extended for other objects (devices). Below we describe the various
parts that form our protocol: protocol setup, identity creation, protocol initialization,
and protocol execution along with the corresponding protocol assumptions.
5.1. System Assumptions
We make the following assumptions commonly made in traditional cellular networks:
(1) The secret key K is stored in the Authentication Center (AuC)’s database as well as
onto the USIM at the time of manufacturing, and is secure similar to the traditional
cellular network. A session key SK, generated by K, is used at both ends.
(2) The AuC at the HSS is a trusted server that does not maliciously send the messages
encrypted by the secret key of one user to others.
5.2. A New Generic Design of the Proposed Protocol
The proposed protocol, illustrated in Figure 3, is described in four parts as follows:
(1) Protocol Setup: Our protocol uses the f1(), f2(), f3(), f4(), f5(), f7(), E/D{} func-
tions, and a function to generate Actcode/SIMcode. Our protocol does not use AK key,
which is generated by the f6() function. Therefore, we will not discuss the f6() function.
We define the structure of various functions as follows:
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f1() Function: It is a reversible symmetric encryption function, such as AES-CTR
(AES with counter mode), where the plaintext and shared key generate the ciphertext,
and then the ciphertext and same key are able to produce original plaintext. The SK
key is available and stored at the UE as well as the HSS. This function is used to
generate a temporary identity (TID) for each user and device.
f2() and f3() Functions: These two functions are used to generate the message au-
thentication code MAC and the signed response RES, respectively. These functions can
be implemented by a one-way HMAC, such as HMACSHA1. The HMACSHA1 takes
input as multiples of 512 bits with padding and SK key depending upon the type of
signaling (RRC, NAS, or UP), and it generates 160 bits of hash code. Out of this, the
first 64 bits are used as MAC and the next 64 bits represent the RES.
f4(), f5(), and f7() Functions: These are also one-way functions, such as HMAC-
SHA256, which takes an input of 512 bits with padding and the SK key, and generates
256 bits of hash code. The first 128 bits are used as the CK key and the next 128 bits
as the IK key. Furthermore, function f7() is used to generate the KASME key. In order
to generate this key, we implement f7() as HMACSHA256 with CK and IK keys that
generates a KASME key of 256 bits. This key further generates different session keys
(KNASint, KNASenc), (KRRCint, KRRCenc), and KUPenc in different signaling planes.
E/D{} Function: It is used to encrypt and decrypt transmitted messages over the
network. The AES-CTR algorithm with KRRCenc/KNASenc/KUPenc key is used to gen-
erate ciphers.
Actcode/SIMcode and KSIASME Generation: We consider a very lightweight
function to initially generate Actcode/SIMcode by using an XOR with left and right
circular shift (LCS/RCS) of the bits of each TID. This function is strictly secret and
operator-specific. We compute KSIASME using f
′
() function implemented by SHA256.
All these functions generate the respective parameters with standard sizes that are
supported by the current protocol security standards, and are being used in present
traditional cellular networks.
(2) Object (User/Device) Identity and Secrets Creation: First, the UE gen-
erates a TID using function f 1() (which is secret and shared only between the UE
and the HSS) with SK key by passing in IMSI and timestamp T1 as input (TID =
f1(IMSI,T1)SK). This f 1() is a symmetric function, hence able to retrieve original IMSI
when we pass TID and T1 as inputs with SK key (IMSI = f1(TID,T1)SK). Actcode is a
one-time activation code that is sent to the HSS. The purpose of this code is to retrieve
and verify SIMcode. It is assumed that a SIMcode is generated and stored onto the
USIM and at AuC when a USIM card gets activated. This SIMcode is attached as a
label to SK key at AuC. The generation of Actcode at UE and SIMcode at HSS are not
publicly accessible and are secret in nature. This can be achieved as follows: at UE:
Actcode = LCSn(T1⊕ SIMcode), and at HSS: SIMcode = RCSn(T1⊕ Actcode), where
LCSn = Left Circular Shift by n, RCSn = Right Circular Shift by n, and n is the value
of first digit of TID (in decimal, convert TID from bits to decimal and pick first leftmost
decimal digit). After identifying the user/device in each session, the HSS sends a
newly generated Actcode encrypted by E{}/D{} to the respective UE. The UE uses
Actcode in the next session while requesting to the MME/HSS. Thus, a new Actcode is
used in each new session, which is secure from to be correctly retrieved by adversaryA.
(3) Protocol Initialization: In our protocol, the KASME , generated by the HSS,
is sent and stored onto the MME. The advantage of doing this is that we do not
need to execute the full AKA protocol again when re-synchronization of the UE is
required. The keys, based on unique KSIASME , are generated only once. Hence, a new
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Fig. 3: Proposed AKA Protocol for the IoT-enabled LTE Network.
{Actcode = LCSn(T1 ⊕ SIMcode), SIMcode = RCSn(T1 ⊕ Actcode), T ID = f1(IMSI, T1)SK ,MAC1 =
XMAC1 = f2(T1, T ID, TAI,Actcode)SK , AV = (AUTN,KASME), AUTN = (T2, AMF,MAC2),MAC2 =
XMAC2 = f2(T2, AMF )CK , AUTN
′
= (T3,MAC
′
, AMF ), RES = XRES = f3(T3)KASME ,MAC
′
=
f2(MAC2, T3, AMF,KSIASME)KASME , XMAC
′
= f2(f2(T2, AMF )CK , T3, AMF,KSIASME)KASME }
KASME is generated each time a request for AV initiates a new session. Therefore, the
generation of new secret key no longer depends upon the previous keys and any other
parameter. Each time, all the derived keys (KNASint, KNASenc), (KRRCint, KRRCenc),
and KUPenc are generated by KASME . For the initial session, a temporary Actcode
is computed by the UE. For the subsequent sessions, the HSS can generate a new
Actcode using the following function, which is sent to the UE in cipher form: Act-
codenew = f
′
(Actcode,Rand)SK, where Rand is a random number. f
′
() is implemented
as AES-CTR. A cannot generate Actcodenew, as it does not know SK key and Rand.
(4) Protocol Execution: Initially, the UE sends a request (message (1) in Fig-
ure 3) to the MME for establishing a connection by transmitting TID, T1, Actcode,
and MAC1, where TID is a temporary ID, T1 is a timestamp, Actcode is a gener-
ated activation code for the UE, MAC1 is a message authentication code (MAC1 =
f2(T1,TID,TAI,Actcode)SK), and SK is a master key generated by K. The MME passes
the received message to the HSS with Serving Network Identity (SNID) and Net-
work Type (NetType), i.e., E-UTRAN (message (2)). Upon receiving the message, the
HSS first checks whether T1 < Tcurrent. If it is true, the HSS computes XMAC1 =
f2(T1,TID,TAI,Actcode)SK and compares it with the received MAC1. If it holds, the
UE is verified by the HSS. Then, the HSS computes SIMcode from the received Act-
code and compares it with the stored value of SIMcode. If both SIMcode match, the
K and SK keys corresponding to that SIMcode are retrieved. Thereafter, the HSS
retrieves IMSI by f 1() with SK key. If the computed IMSI is same as the stored
IMSI, the HSS computes AV. Otherwise, the request is discarded and the connection
is terminated. Afterwards, the HSS generates (T2, KASME , AMF) and MAC2 (MAC2
= f2(T2,AMF)CK) as a part of AV along with CK and IK keys, and sends AV to the
MME (message (3)), where AMF is the Authentication Management Field. Upon re-
ceiving the message from the HSS, the MME generates (T3, MAC
′
, AUTN
′
) and sends
AUTN
′
to the UE along with a generated XKSIASME (message (4)), where MAC
′
=
f 2(MAC2, T3, AMF, KSIASME)KASME . On receiving the message, the UE generates (CK,
IK, KSIASME), computes XMAC
′
= f 2(f 2(T2, AMF)CK, T3, AMF, KSIASME)KASME , and
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compares whether MAC
′ ?
= XMAC
′
. If such condition does not hold, the connection
is terminated. Otherwise, the MME and the HSS are verified by the UE. Then the
UE computes signed response RES, generates a new XKSI
′
ASME , and computes a new
KSIASME by using XKSIASME and XKSI
′
ASME as inputs to a predefined f
′
() function
shared between the MME and the UE. Thereafter, the UE transmits the message (5)
to the MME with RES and XKSI
′
ASME , where RES = f 3(T3, XKSI
′
ASME)KASME . Upon
receiving message (5), the MME computes XRES = f3(T3, XKSI
′
ASME)KASME and com-
pares it with the received RES. If both are equal, the UE is verified by the MME, and
then the MME generates a new KSIASME , by putting in XKSIASME and XKSI
′
ASME
to the f
′
(). Hence, the UE and the MME have the same KSIASME without transmit-
ting it over the network. Afterward, the MME transmits the actual KSIASME to the
HSS (message (6)). All the UE, MME, and HSS store KASME and KSIASME in their
memory/database. After completion of authentication, the MME sends message (7) to
the UE with encrypted Global Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI), and finally the UE
acknowledges the receipt of GUTI to the MME (message (8)).
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we present security analysis of our protocol in terms of security goals
and properties, resistance against attacks, and privacy properties. A flowchart describ-
ing differences between the EPS-AKA and proposed protocol is shown in Figure 4.
Mutual Authentication and No Synchronization Issue. The proposed protocol
provides mutual authentications between the UE-MME and the UE-HSS. Our protocol
also solves synchronization issue in the LTE network.
In our protocol, the HSS authenticates the UE by verifying MAC1. To authenticate
the HSS, the UE checks the received MAC
′
from the MME. If MAC
′
is equal to XMAC
′
,
both, the HSS and the MME are authenticated by the UE. This process ensures mutual
authentications between the UE and the HSS. Furthermore, the MME authenticates
the UE by verifying RES. After receiving the message, the MME computes XRES and
compares whether RES ?= XRES. The UE is authenticated, if this equality holds. The
same procedure takes place in authenticating the UE when the MME receives RES
while communicating with only MME (within a session).
Fig. 4: Protocol flowchart: EPS-AKA (green) and proposed protocol actions (red).
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Property 1. IND-CMA. The proposed protocol maintains IND-CMA.
In our protocol, the messages encrypted by the same session key generate different
ciphertexts, as at least one of the input parameters (in plaintext) is always different.
The UE generates TID as f1(IMSI, T1)SK , where T1 changes each time the UE sends
a request to the MME. Furthermore, the UE also generates a fresh Actcode and sends
it to the MME. The UE and the MME generate a fresh KASME key for each session.
Moreover, the SK and KASME keys are never sent over the network, hence A cannot
retrieve these keys. Since we use AES-CTR as an encrypted algorithm, it encrypts
the successive values of a counter with AES, and regurgitates the concatenation of
the encrypted blocks. It is challenging for A to distinguish between such streams of
equal lengths. Even if we provide a message and an encrypted oracle to adversary,
he/she does not have any advantage to correctly guess any other messages. Therefore,
AES-CTR is chosen message indistinguishable, even from random noise.
Property 2. Key Secrecy. Key secrecy for session and derived keys is maintained.
Any derived key, say Qkey, is generated by the session key KASME at the UE in the
LTE network, which is also securely received by an honest serving MME network from
the home HSS network. New session keys are derived by KASME key, and these keys
are independent from each other in each session. Therefore, the Qkey key preserves
one-session secrecy in the IoT-enabled LTE network. Our protocol is also able to solve
the synchronization issue, as it does not use any sequence number. Timestamps are
used in the protocol to prevent replay attack, not for synchronizing received AV.
Property 3. Key Theft, Key-identity Theft, and Attempts to Derive Keys. Ad-
versary A cannot extract the secret key SK, session key KASME , and key-ID (KSIASME)
over the network. In fact, A will fail to retrieve SK or KASME key, even if it captures
Actcode of a user/device sent over the network.
Each KASME is generated by the CK and IK keys, and is generated at the MME and
at the UE. Note that A cannot retrieve the SK and KASME keys, as they are never
sent over the network. Moreover, if A retrieves few Actcode, it cannot derive any rela-
tion among them, as these Actcode are randomly generated each time. Moreover, each
Actcode is sent exactly once in plaintext over the network from the UE to the MME. It
will not work, if A uses previous generated Actcode in a new session. Furthermore, if
Amodifies Actcode, the computed MAC ′1 at the MME will not match with the received
MAC1 at the UE. Hence, the connection will be terminated. XKSIASME is sent over
the network with the integrity protection. However, the actual KSIASME is never sent
over the network, which prevents the LTE network against Key-ID theft.
Property 4. Identity Privacy and Identity Theft. Adversary A cannot trace the
original identity of the UE. In fact, A will fail to recognize the actual user, even if it
captures TID of a user/device.
The privacy of each UE (identity) is well protected during authentication over the
network. The TID is computed from the original IMSI as TID = f1(IMSI, T1)SK , where
function f1() is reversible in nature for encryption and decryption. We implement func-
tion f1() as AES-CTR with a KASME key, which prevents the system against MITM
attacks, as it is able to hide the actual identity of the user, and also no practical full
attack has been found on AES until today. For all the authentication requests includ-
ing the subsequent requests, a different TID is generated each time a user connects
to the visiting MME. The MME and HSS flush out the TID from their memory, once
a connection between the UE and the MME is terminated (either successful or invalid
request abort). Hence, A cannot relate TID with the original IMSI of a user.
Property 5. Session Unlinkability, and Forward and Backward Untraceabil-
ity. Adversary A cannot link current session information with the previous sessions.
Moreover, our protocol maintains perfect forward/backward untraceability.
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For each fresh request, the UE and the MME generate a fresh session key, tempo-
rary identity of the user/device, Actcode, KASME session key, and other derived keys.
Therefore, A cannot retrieve any information based on linkability among various re-
quests. Moreover, the KASME key is generated each time for a session. Hence, even
compromising the current KASME will not allow A to generate future and past keys.
In addition, if the past keys are compromised, they cannot be used for future sessions,
as both ends generate a new session and derived keys in each session.
Property 6. Information Unlinkability and Confidentiality. A cannot generate
a SIMcode even if it receives Actcode considering generation function secret in nature.
The generation of Actcode and SIMcode are secret in nature and are network
operator-specific. If A finds Actcode, it cannot obtain SIMcode, as A does not know
the generation function and cannot retrieve the SK key. Function f 1() is used to gen-
erate TID = f 1(IMSI,T1)SK and IMSI = f 1(TID,T1)SK. If A knows f 1(), it cannot forge
the function, as A does not know SK key. Functions f 2(), f 3(), f 4(), and f 5() are based
on HMAC with hash, such as HMACSHA1 and HMACSHA256. These functions are
one-way in nature, and are considered secure till date. Therefore, it is not possible to
break the security of these functions. A cannot retrieve any confidential information.
Property 7. Attack Resistance. Our protocol defeats MITM, replay, redirection,
and impersonation attacks between the UE and the MME. Furthermore, A can neither
compromise message security nor retrieve any information by delaying messages.
We justify that our protocol is secure against various attacks as follows:
(1) Replay Attack: Our protocol includes timestamps (T1, T2, T3) with each trans-
mitted message over the network. Therefore, the protocol is free from this attack.
(2) MITM Attack: Privacy preservation of IMSI and KSIASME helps to prevent the
LTE network against MITM attack. In addition, message encryption with cipher keys
using AES-CTR in different contexts defeats this attack. For an example, at the MME,
GUTI is encrypted by KASME , and is sent it to the UE. Similarly, KNASenc, KRRCenc,
and KUPenc are used for ciphering in NAS signaling, RRC signaling, and UP planes
existing between UE-MME, UE-eNB, and UE-eNB, respectively. Even if A captures
TID and Actcode, it cannot derive the actual key K, as this key is securely stored
at AuC similar to the traditional cellular network. It is impossible to retrieve K key,
because it never participates, and only the session keys are used to perform operations.
(3) Redirection Attack: Our protocol uses MAC to maintain the integrity of TAI
that prevents the network against redirection attack. This attack is easily possible
when A gets the correct UE’s information. In our protocol, the UE includes TAI of eNB
in MAC1, and transmits MAC1 to the MME. Authentication request is discarded, when
the HSS fails to match the TAI sent by the MME and embedded in the XMAC1.
(4) Object-identity Theft: In our protocol, the UE transmits a temporary object-
identity TID instead of clear text IMSI during initial attach procedure over the LTE
network that protects the object’s information against object identity theft.
(5) Impersonation Attack: In our protocol, MAC1 is computed at the UE and sent
to the HSS. The HSS computes XMAC1 using the SK key. Note that the HSS computes
XMAC1 that also includes the TAI of the UE received from the MME, whereas the UE
computes MAC1 based on actual TAI. In addition, A must reply with a valid response
to the MME such that (RES = XRES) in order to impersonate the UE. However, it
is not possible for A to have the correct RES. Similarly, the attempt to impersonate
the MME will not be successful, as the UE verifies that it had not requested for an
authentication, but still receives AUTN
′
from the MME. If an adversary knows the
initial working of the function to generate Actcode and later uses a code to impersonate
a user, the server rejects the code, as the code can only be used once at the initial stage
when the USIM card gets activated. Furthermore, the adversary cannot generate the
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Table III: Summary of Various LTE AKA Protocols
Prevent Parameters EPS-AKA
[Kφien
2011]
[Gu
2011]
[Chou.
2012]
[Pukh.
2012]
Proposed
AKA
IMSI over the network No No Yes Yes No Yes
KSIASME over the network No No No No No Yes
Replay Attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Redirection Attack Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
MITM Attack No No No No No Yes
User-ID Theft No No No Yes No Yes
Key-ID Theft No No No No No Yes
Synchronization No No Yes No No Yes
IoT Support No No No No No Yes
same code as a legitimate user for the subsequent authentications because the SK key
and a random number Rand are unknown to A, even if it knows the function.
(6) Message Modification: The integrity protection of the transmitted messages
including message content and its threshold delivery in time, (i.e., Treceive ≤ Tgenerate+
Tthreshold) is maintained using MAC that helps to prevent the system against message
tampering. We consider and define MAC functions for protecting message integrity. A
MAC = {KeyGen, Comp, Verif} is a triple (key generation, MAC computation, and MAC
verification) of an algorithm with associated key space K and message space M. The
standard security notion for a randomized MAC: K×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is Unforgeability
under Chosen Message and Chosen Verification Queries Attack (UF-CMVA).
Definition 6.1. We consider AdvUF−CMVAMAC (A, λ, QComp, QV erif ) as an advantage for
adversary A in forging a message with a random key k ← KG(1λ), where A can make
QComp and QV erif queries.
Clearly, A cannot obtain such an advantage, as we use one-way HMACSHA1 and
HMACSHA256, which are hard to break. The protocol is also secure against narrow
pipe attack related to HMAC functions. Narrow pipe attack can compromise HMAC
function only with related key, whereas hash functions used with HMAC can be com-
promised with single and related keys. Our goal is to find a patch that does not affect
the definition of hash function and could prevent HMAC against this attack. We pro-
pose a solution by appending an extra fixed bit (1 or 0) before an input message. We
also use different initialization vector values for inner and outer hash functions in
HMAC [Peyrin et al. 2012]. This process prevents HMAC against narrow pipe attack.
Table III summarizes several features of EPS-AKA, proposed protocol, and other
existing protocols. The proposed protocol prevents IMSI and KSIASME to be sent over
the network, and provides resistance against attacks and synchronization solution.
Property 8. Untraceability, Forward Privacy, and Anonymity. Adversary A
cannot compromise privacy of the user/device, as our protocol maintains untraceability,
forward privacy, and anonymity properties.
Definition 6.2. (Untraceability): Our protocol satisfies untraceability if A cannot
distinguish whether two TIDs correspond to the same UE or two different UE.
Verif(publicChannel).[(f1(IMSI1, T1)SK1 , f1(IMSI2, T2)SK2)|TIDi|UE|HSS] ≈
Verif(publicChannel).[f1(IMSI1, T1)SK1 |f1(IMSI1, T2)SK1 |TIDi|UE|HSS]
If adversary A retrieves a TID and makes a query from a random oracle to generate
several TID from IMSI identities, A cannot conclude which IMSI matches with the re-
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trieved TID. The reason is that our protocol implements AES-CTR with inputs of IMSI
and a timestamp Ti to provide a unique TID each time. Furthermore, our protocol gen-
erates a new key for each session, and then derives various other keys for the RRC
signaling, NAS signaling, and UP planes. Therefore, linkability to previous sessions
is not possible. Also, by keeping the generated identities and messages during cur-
rent session (say time t), A cannot determine and prove after tfrd time whether these
messages belong to a particular object. Similarly, A cannot retrieve whether tbrd time
ago, these messages were generated by a particular object, as each session’s identities,
keys, and messages are independent.
Definition 6.3. (Forward Privacy): Our protocol satisfies forward privacy if A is al-
lowed to trace the user/device in current session, but it cannot trace the information
related to the previous protocol sessions. In other words,
V erif(publicChannel).[(IMSI1at T3, f1(IMSI2, T4)SK2)|TIDi|UE|HSS] ≈
V erif(publicChannel).[f1(IMSI1, T1)SK1 |f1(IMSI2, T2)SK2 |TIDi|UE|HSS];
We also consider forward privacy scenario, where even if A is given a breakable
IMSI1 at time T3, A cannot trace TID1 at time T1 due to identity generation by AES-
CTR, where T1 < T2 < T3 < T4. Furthermore, we quantify the anonymity provided by
TID in terms of the advantage of A for correctly guessing the challenge bit.
Definition 6.4. (IND-ANO: Indistinguishability under Anonymous Identity): Our
protocol is IND-ANO if no adversary A at time t can distinguish between two chosen
identity IMSI1 and IMSI2 with negligible  advantage.
Pr[A(f1(IMSI1, T1)SK1)) = 1]− Pr[A(f1(IMSI2, T2)SK2)) = 1] ≤ .
Our protocol maintains anonymity, as the actual identity is only known to the UE
and the HSS. The serving network MME believes on the facts provided by the HSS.
7. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section provides performance analysis of our protocol in terms of storage overhead
at the UE, MME, and HSS, bandwidth consumption, and efficiency of the system.
(1) Storage Overhead at UE, MME, and HSS: Our protocol generates a light
storage overhead (see Figure 3) in order to successfully prevent clear text transmission
of IMSI and KSIASME . The KSIASME and KASME are stored to generate different
subsequent keys for signaling and data channels. The UE and the MME store (IMSI,
GUTI, KSIASME , KASME) and (TID, GUTI, KSIASME , KASME), respectively, whereas
the HSS stores (TID, IMSI, KSIASME , KASME).
(2) Communication Overhead: We calculate the total transmitted messages size
(bits) in order to evaluate communication overhead of our protocol considering single
authentication vector. We assume that all the protocols are of the standard parame-
ters and their sizes. The total number of bits in the messages of each LTE AKA pro-
tocol is as follows: EPS-AKA=1638 bits, Kφien’s AKA=1752 bits, Purkhiabani et al.’s
AKA=2019 bits, Choudhury et al.’s AKA=1890 bits, and our AKA protocol=1647 bits.
Note that the size of ACK is 3 bits. However, even if we make it 8 bits, our protocol is
still better in terms of each point of discussion in the paper as compared to EPS-AKA.
In fact, 3 bits leads to 8 different combinations, which is more than sufficient, as there
is only one ACK needs to be sent during authentication. Total bandwidth used by our
protocol during authentication as compared to the EPS-AKA, Kφien’s [Kφien 2011],
Purkhiabani’s [Purkhiabani 2012], and Choudhury’s [Choudhury et al. 2012] proto-
cols are 100.5%, 94.0%, 81.5%, and 87.1%, respectively. Hence, our protocol reduces
6%, 18.5%, and 12.9% bandwidth utilization during authentication in comparison to
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Table IV: Bandwidth Consumption by Various Protocols
Bandwidth
Utilization (bits)
EPS-
AKA
[Kφien
2011]
[Purkhiabani
2012]
[Choudhury
et al. 2012]
Proposed-
AKA
Between UE-MME 627 676 944 794 697
Between MME-HSS 1011 1076 1075 1096 886
[Kφien 2011], [Purkhiabani 2012], and [Choudhury et al. 2012] protocols respectively,
except -0.5% for EPS-AKA. There is only 9-bit overhead difference between EPS-AKA
and our protocol, which can be considered negligible.
(3) Computation Overhead: In order to evaluate the total computation overhead
generated by each protocol with global values, all the computation functions are con-
sidered a unit value. This is a fair assumption [Zhang and Fang 2005], [Al-Saraireh
and Yousef 2006], [Saxena and Chaudhari 2014], and the reason for choosing unit
value is that it considers all the functions of various AKA protocols as global, and it
assigns an equal weight without knowing their structures. We evaluate total compu-
tation overhead generated by each protocol as follows: (1) EPS-AKA protocol = 13, (2)
Kφien’s protocol = 11, and with the generation of KASME by a standard function with
CK and IK at the UE and the MME, total functions = 15, (3) Purkhiabani’s protocol =
23, (4) Hiten Choudhury’s protocol = 15, and (5) Proposed protocol = 19.
Figure 5(a) represents the communication and computation overheads of all the LTE
AKA protocols, and Figure 5(b) compares them with respect to EPS-AKA. It shows that
our protocol is efficient, as it generates lower communication overhead.
(4) Bandwidth Consumption: Our protocol is able to reduce bandwidth utilization
between the MME and the HSS. From Table IV, it can be observed that for a single au-
thentication, the protocol lowers (100-(950/1011)*100=) 6.1%, 11.8%, 11.7%, and 13.4%
of the bandwidth utilization between MME-HSS as compared to the EPS-AKA, [Kφien
2011], [Purkhiabani 2012], and [Choudhury et al. 2012] protocols, respectively.
Figure 6(a) illustrates the bandwidth consumption between UE-MME, MME-HSS,
and UE-HSS, whereas Figure 6(b) shows the bandwidth utilization by other LTE AKA
protocols with respect to EPS-AKA. The bandwidth utilization between the UE and
the MME is slightly increased by our protocol about 11% and 3% in comparison to
the EPS-AKA and Kφien’s [Kφien 2011] protocols (while reduces by 26.2% and 12.3%
with respect to the Purkhiabani’s [Purkhiabani 2012] and Choudhury’s [Choudhury
et al. 2012] protocols). But we cannot declare this as a limitation, because overall in
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Fig. 6: Bandwidth consumption.
each authentication process, our protocol reduces 105 bits (1752-1647=105 bits) to be
transmitted as compared to the Kφien’s [Kφien 2011] protocol. In each authentication,
our protocol lowers 61 bits and 126 bits with respect to the EPS-AKA and Kφien’s
[Kφien 2011] protocols. The bandwidth consumption by other protocols stated in the
literature are not computed, as they do not clearly define their parameters.
7.1. Simulation of the Proposed Protocol
We simulate the proposed protocol with a client server paradigm, where the UE is a
client and the MME/HSS are servers. All the simulated results are obtained on Core i3
processor, 2GB RAM, 320GB hard disk, Windows7, and J2ME Wireless Tool Kit (WTK)
with JDK1.7. We implement functions f4(), f 5(), and f 7() as HMACSHA256. Further,
functions f 2() and f 3() are considered as HMACSHA1. However, all these functions
are network operator-specific. The output of functions f 4() and f 5() are truncated to
128 bits, as these functions are used to generate 128 bits of CK and IK keys, respec-
tively. Similarly, the output of functions f 2() and f 3() are also truncated to 64 bits, as
f 2() produces the output MCA1/MAC2/MAC
′
of 64 bits in size, whereas f 3() generates
an output as RES of 64 bits. we use an extra fixed bit before the input message and
also use different initialization vector values for the inner and outer hash functions
in HMAC. This prevents HMAC against narrow pipe attack. The function to gener-
ate Actcode/SIMcode is an XOR function with LCS/RCS, whereas AES with counter
mode (AES-CTR) is suitable for the encryption/decryption (EK{}/DK{}) [Saxena and
Chaudhari 2014] with 256-bit KASME key. The output of f 1() is TID/IMSI of 128 bits.
Therefore, we implement f 1() with 128 bits SK key similar to AES encryption (to get
TID/GUTI) and decryption (to retrieve IMSI). The generation of KSIASME is imple-
mented by SHA256 hash function, which takes 20 milliseconds (ms) to compute.
Simulation results presented in Table V and Table VI are the average of 30 iterations
for each output value. Here, the unit of time is ms and memory/space is measured
in bytes. We calculate the transmission time for each message in our protocol with
upload link speed at 11 Mbps and download link speed at 20 Mbps [EE 2014]. The
Execution Time (Ext), Process CPU Time (PCPU), and Total Memory Usage (TUM) of
functions EK{}/DK{} and f 1() can be observed from Table V. Similarly, Table VI shows
the computation results of f 2()/f 3()/f 4()/f 5()/f7() and Actcode/SIMcode. Interestingly, we
observed the same encryption/decryption time by AES with key sizes of 128 bits and
256 bits on J2ME WTK. AES took 8.8 ms for EK{} and 9.1 ms for DK{} [Saxena and
Chaudhari 2014]. On average, the total execution time for our protocol = 3.23 Sec.
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Table V: Computation Results of f1() and EK{}/DK{}
EK{} ExT (ms) TUM (bytes) DK{} ExT (ms) TUM (bytes)
8.8 9329.6 9.1 4816
Table VI: Computation Results of f2()/f3()/f4()/f5()/f7()/Actcode
Functions ExT (ms) PCPUT (ms) TUM (bytes)
f2()/f3() = HMACSHA1 221.60 296.40 15211840
f4()/f5()/f7() = HMACSHA256 273.41 296.40 15204024
Actcode/SIMcode 0.89 93.60 12968290
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has described a secure protocol for the IoT-enabled LTE network. This pro-
tocol presents several advantages with respect to the LTE network, and provides a se-
cure and privacy-preserved environment that enables secure communications among
the IoT objects (users and devices). Our protocol also prevents the need of synchro-
nization unlike in the EPS-AKA protocol, as it does not use sequence number for the
transmission of authentication information, instead uses MAC to verify information.
Security analysis demonstrates that our protocol maintains collision-free MACs, indis-
tinguishability under chosen message attack, key secrecy and theft, identity privacy
and theft, session unlinkability, and confidentiality. Our analysis indicates that the
proposed protocol provides prevention against various attacks, such as man-in-the-
middle attack (using AES-CTR), object-ID theft (by generating TID), key-ID theft (by
generating secret KSIASME), replay attack (by using timestamps), impersonation at-
tack (using TID and signed response RES), and redirection attack (using TAI and
MAC). It also provides untraceability, forward privacy, and anonymity to the IoT ob-
jects (users/devices). Simulation results show that for a single authentication vector,
our protocol utilizes lesser bandwidth (at least 6%) between the MME and the HSS,
and lowers communication overhead (at least 6% except EPS-AKA) during authenti-
cation as compared to the existing protocols of the LTE network. The execution time
of our protocol is 3.23 Sec., which is a reasonable time frame in real time. Therefore,
our protocol is suitable to use for the communications among various IoT objects in the
LTE network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt of protecting the
identities of key set identifier and the object over the network to make it IoT-enabled.
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